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Escaping the ‘China Dream’ (Hopefully)
Foreign Policy -- National Review

Escaping the ‘China Dream’ (Hopefully)

Published October 21, 2026 · 07:04 PM UTC
Read full story at National Review →
Source excerpt -- National Review
The Week of October 12, 2026: China’s trade war, AI, inequality, tariffs, and much more.
The Anvil Daily's Analysis: Why This Matters

# Why This Matters

The machinery of Trump's second-term trade offensive is now grinding through its most consequential phase. What began as campaign rhetoric about "reciprocal tariffs" has calcified into actual policy: the administration has signaled plans to impose 25% baseline tariffs on Chinese imports and is weaponizing Section 301 investigations to justify sector-specific duties reaching 60% on semiconductors and advanced manufacturing. Unlike 2018, when tariffs were rolled out piecemeal and partially reversed, this iteration is being framed as permanent reordering. The timing matters. China's economy is already contracting below government targets—manufacturing output growth dropped to 4.3% in September, the slowest pace since 2020—and capital flight accelerated through Q3. A sustained tariff regime doesn't just hit Beijing's growth numbers; it ripples through supply chains for everything from iPhones to EV batteries that American companies actually depend on.

What's genuinely at stake is whether the U.S. manufacturing base can actually relocate fast enough to matter, or whether American consumers and producers just pay more while supply chains absorb the shock. Shein, which has built a $66 billion valuation on ultra-cheap Chinese manufacturing and logistics, could face existential pressure under the tariff schedule being discussed—a company that essentially monetized U.S. consumer price sensitivity would suddenly become uncompetitive overnight. But the real exposure is institutional. Ford, Apple, and the entire semiconductor supply chain are entangled with Chinese production and assembly. A 60% tariff on chips doesn't punish China directly; it forces Qualcomm and Intel to either absorb margin collapse or pass costs to end buyers. The administration argues this creates incentive for reshoring. Critics note it takes years to build foundries, and in the meantime, inflation metrics will feel the hit first.

The closest historical precedent is the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, which raised import duties to an average of 45% and sparked immediate retaliation. U.S. exports fell 66% within two years. The analogy breaks down because modern supply chains are far more integrated and retaliation is now surgical—China doesn't need to match tariff-for-tariff; it can simply reduce purchases of American agricultural exports and rare earth minerals—but the core dynamic is identical: tariffs abroad become inflation at home, and trading partners don't cooperate. The Trump administration's counter-argument is that Smoot-Hawley was unilateral and lacked leverage; this time, the U.S. has actual market power as a consumer of Chinese goods, and the pain is intentional and temporary. That's not obviously wrong, but it requires China to capitulate faster than any large economy historically has.

The conservative case for this policy is straightforward: China has waged a 15-year campaign of IP theft, forced technology transfer, and predatory pricing that has eviscerated American manufacturing employment. Tariffs are the only tool that actually changes Beijing's calculus because tariffs hurt corporate profit margins in ways diplomacy and intellectual property suits never will. If Apple has to choose between paying tariffs or building in Vietnam, jobs move. This is wealth transfer from Chinese exporters and American consumers to American manufacturers and workers in industries that actually produce things. The objection that this causes inflation is valid but secondary—stagflation is better than managed decline under unfair trade terms. If the cost of restoring an American manufacturing base is 3-4% higher prices for 18 months, that's the price of sovereignty.

What to watch: Congress is scheduled to vote on extending or modifying Section 301 authority by mid-November 2026. The timeline is critical because China's government is signaling it will only negotiate tariff reductions if the U.S. commits to a specific ceiling—anything above 30% is, per Beijing's stated position, grounds for abandoning ongoing talks. The real test comes in January 2027, when the current executive orders expire and the administration must decide whether to renew at existing rates, escalate, or negotiate down. Agricultural states that benefited from Trump's first term through tariff